As you look out the terminal window at jet-powered rides, note the elegant profile, swept wings, and sleek tail surfaces of the aircraft on the ramp. Settling into your seat, examine the tightly cowled engine pods, multiple ailerons and spoilers, and smooth upper surface of the wing.

Have you ever wondered when all these elegant design features made their debut? The answer is December 17, 1947. On the 47th anniversary of the Wright Brothers’ first powered flight—and the 15th anniversary of the Douglas DC-3’s initial jaunt—a radical prototype, the XB-47 Stratojet, took to the air for its first flight. Aviation has never been the same.

However, the story really kicks off in 1943. As it began deploying fleets of B-17 and B-24 bombers to bases all over England, the Army Air Corps looked in its crystal ball and saw that the U.S. was woefully behind in the development of jet airplanes. Soon, four legendary aircraft companies were awarded contracts to develop four- and six-engine medium jet bombers. Three of these designs retained a conventional straight wing with engines embedded in the wing.

However, after the war in Europe ended in 1945, Boeing engineer George Schairer traveled overseas to learn of the advanced aerodynamics research done by German engineers and scientists. He immediately called home to Seattle and told the Boeing design team to brace for some major changes.

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The XB-47 Stratojet that emerged featured 35-degree swept wings mounted at shoulder height on the fuselage. The six General Electric J47 engines were mounted in pods slung below the wing to ease engine access and keep the wing surface clean. The inboards were mounted in pairs of two and the outboards singly. The tail surfaces were swept, and when combined with the ultra-smooth fuselage, the XB-47 looked like it came right out of a science fiction novel.

Because of the requirement for a large bomb bay, the landing gear consisted of twin tandem bicycle-gear trucks mounted fore and aft on the fuselage and two outriggers located in the inboard engine pods. The two pilots sat above the fuselage in a fighter-style bubble canopy, and the navigator/observer sat in the partially glazed nose. Defensive armament consisted of just two radar-aimed cannons, operated by the copilot and located in the tail.

Why only two guns in the tail? When the B-47 made its debut, it could fly higher and faster than any fighters of the day.

However, it was the first large swept-wing aircraft. Following the dictum that “experience is a hard teacher as it often gives the test before the lesson,” the B-47 was developed carefully. The prototype suffered from a serious case of Dutch roll, a motion caused by a yaw condition inherent in swept-wing aircraft. The incorporation of a yaw damper, now commonplace, solved the problem. The prototype also pitched up at high speed, triggered by the stalling of the outer wing section. This was solved by adding vortex generators, now ubiquitous on modern jet aircraft.

By early 1949, it was time to let the world know what the Boeing engineers had created. The XB-47 flew from Moses Lake, Washington, to Washington, D.C., at an average speed of 606 mph, covering 2,289 miles in 3 hours and 46 minutes. This flight spelled the end for the competing designs, and eventually more than 2,000 B-47 Stratojets were built in various configurations, a production number now considered unheard of for a jet bomber.

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But the B-47 was not without its problems. Pilots who had grown up on piston-powered World War II aircraft had to adapt to this new jet, which demanded to be flown exactly by the numbers. With a moment’s inattention, the sleek B-47 could easily accelerate beyond its maximum design speed with disastrous results. At 40,000 feet, the aircraft introduced its pilots to the concept of coffin corner, where the gap between stall speed and maximum Mach number is quite small. Slow down and enter a stall; speed up and risk Mach tuck as the nose may pitch down uncontrollably.

The B-47’s flexible wing, great for high-speed flight, introduced the concept of aileron reversal. At 450 knots at low altitude, the ailerons, located at the wing tips, acted like trim tabs and simply twisted the thin wing without turning the airplane. The only way to restore control was to slow down. Next time you look out at the wing of a modern airliner, note that ailerons are placed both at the tip for low-speed flight and at the wing root for high-speed flight.

You can thank the lessons learned from the B-47 for that innovation. However, they came at a high cost: Approximately 10 percent of the B-47 fleet—203 aircraft and, sadly, 464 flight crewmembers—were lost to accidents. All completely unacceptable today, but at the time, it was the price of progress into the jet age.

If the B-47 is the mother jet, who are its famous children? The legendary Boeing B-52, which may fly for nearly 100 years, was the first to benefit. But the real winner was the Boeing 367-80, or known simply as the “Dash 80.” Boeing bet the company on developing the world’s first successful jet airliner, and the Dash 80 begat the 707, which begat the 747, which begat the 787. They all sported the same 35-degree swept wings, pod-mounted engines, and swept tail feathers as the B-47. Oh, yes, and a yaw damper, vortex generators, and various other innovations learned from the Stratojet.

So, as you take your seat for the next airline trip, look around you. Note the basic configuration of your Boeing or Airbus. It is little changed from the original Boeing 707 and the Dash 80, and you can thank Schairer, the groundbreaking engineers and skilled aircrews, and the incredible Boeing B-47 Stratojet for that. 

• READ MORE: Boeing Max and the Case of the Missing Bolts

Editor’s note: This story originally appeared in the Nov/Dec 2023 issue of Plane & Pilot magazine. 

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On January 5, a door plug separated from the frame of an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 Max 9 as it climbed through 16,000 feet. The flight crew was able to report the emergency to ATC and land the aircraft—and only minor injuries were reported. 

Aviation has grown increasingly safe over the past few decades, with safety records ticking up steadily to the point that it’s statistically less dangerous to take a commercial flight across the planet than to get in your car and drive to the next city. General aviation isn’t quite at that level, although safety numbers on that front have been climbing as well—an aging GA fleet accessible to the majority of pilots notwithstanding. This incident would seem to be a warning call to remind us that aviation is safe because we work so hard to make it so. 

But apparently there were warnings before this for this particular aircraft. According to the NTSB’s preliminary report, the aircraft had experienced pressurization problems on December 30, just a few days before the door plug blew out. 

Without knowing all of the details, I can’t comment on this particular case. 

But the whole scenario has me thinking a lot in general about the human factors of aviation and the checks we use to protect ourselves and others in the air. We have developed these checks with the full understanding that human beings are fallible and subject to pressures that can lead, at times, to bad decision-making. 

In fact, the recognition of human factors in aviation dates to its early days when accidents were often attributed solely to technical failures. Over time, it became evident that human error caused a significant number of accidents. This realization led to the establishment of human-related factors as a distinct field within aviation, with a focus on studying and mitigating the impact of those issues. 

To help mitigate this fallibility, professionals in aviation go through rigorous training and testing. They must use checklists. And they are required to make decisions that occasionally put personal interest (or at scale, economic interest) behind scrapping a flight because the risk is just too high, whether because of a potential maintenance issue, weather, or a crewmember just can’t hack it that day. 

Economic considerations in aviation are not small. Sometimes the safety of a flight is weighed against the commercial ramifications of failing to complete it. And that is powerful medicine, especially when risk looks somewhat abstract from the ground. However, pressure to complete a flight or project on schedule or within a particular budget should never eclipse safety considerations. 

It’s always worthwhile to slow down, investigate, and triple-check that our T’s are crossed and I’s dotted. We can’t allow all of the safe flights we’ve had before lead to complacency. 

Aviation is made safe by people committing to following established procedures, double-checking everything, and putting the safety of a given flight above commercial concerns or other social or psychological pressures. It takes strength to do this, but it’s so vital. In commercial aviation or general aviation, we should trust—but always verify. 

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As a result, the FAA ordered an emergency grounding of all Boeing 737 Max 9s pending inspection. EASA, Europe’s civil aviation consortium, validated the missive for aircraft under EASA-affiliate country registrations. Those inspections continue this week, causing some flight cancellations across the U.S.

A photograph sent to Portland television station KPTV by a passenger shows a gap in the fuselage where a window would normally be and the oxygen masks deployed. A photograph taken from the exterior of the aircraft when it was on the ground shows it was a rear door that was blown out. According to industry officials, it is a panel called a “plug door,” and it can be used as a door or as a window for an extra row of seats.

There were reports of only minor injuries. One passenger reported that the force of depressurization pulled a child’s shirt off their body.

According to FlightAware.com, the flight took off from Portland at 4:52 p.m. PST, reaching an altitude of approximately 16,000 feet, then descended and returned to the airport by 5:27 p.m. 

According to a statement from Alaska Airlines, “Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 from Portland, Oregon, to Ontario, California, experienced an incident this evening soon after departure. The aircraft landed safely back at Portland International Airport with 174 guests and six6 crew members. We are investigating what happened and will share more information as it becomes available.”

The Boeing Company reports having a technical team supporting the investigation, stating, “We are aware of the incident involving Alaska Airlines Flight 1282. We are working to gather more information and are in contact with our airline customer.”

The FAA notes that the agency, along with the National Transportation and Safety Board, are investigating the incident.

The original story was posted on FLYINGmag.com and will be updated as more information becomes available.

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ForeFlight, a Boeing Company, has announced its acquisition of CloudAhoy, a debriefing software provider.

According to a post on the ForeFlight blog, the acquisition was completed in response to “customer desire for more integrated digital solutions.”

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ForeFlight, established in 2007, is one of the most widely used weather briefing and flight planning and management tools.

CloudAhoy, created in 2011, provides post-flight debriefing, analytics, and flight operations quality assurance software products. CloudAhoy allows pilots to digitally record their flight and play it back to review their performance. The software is particularly useful in the training environment where the emphasis is on meeting and exceeding the minimum standards for certification.

The details of the merger have not been announced.

For more information, visit the ForeFlight blog.

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A few things about the plane, nicknamed by some brilliant PR person “The Queen of the Skies.” The 747 made its first flight in February of 1969, a fitting precursor to the Summer of Love, and was first delivered the following January to Pan Am, which eventually bought 65 of the jumbo jets out of the 1,574 produced over the years. The first 747, the -100 model, was around 230 feet in length and would typically carry as many as 360 passengers with a maximum takeoff weight of 750,000 pounds. The 747-8, the last passenger plane in the lineup, was usually configured to carry up to 467 people. It was much larger, with a max takeoff weight of more than 900,000 pounds, a length of 250 feet and a wingspan of 224 feet. It is, and will be for some time, one of the largest aircraft ever built.

And what an eventful life it led. Christened by then First Lady Pat Nixon, the 747 would go on to be used to haul the Space Shuttle; it was involved in the worst accident in aviation history, the Tenerife disaster, which was no fault of the two 747s that collided on the foggy island’s runway; one 747 was shot down by the Soviet Union in 1983; and TWA Flight 800 exploded in midair after, according to the NTSB, its center fuel tank exploded. The 747 also set what’s surely an unbeatable record, when an El Al 747 carried more than 1,000 passengers in an evacuation of Ethiopian Jews, making it the largest passenger load of an aircraft in history.

The parting gift from Boeing’s final 747? The plane created a track in the sky—thanks, FlightAware for capturing the gem for us—of an empress’s crown.

And while Boeing has made the last delivery of a 747 outfitted for commercial use, this one for cargo with Atlas Air, the company is still working on new version of Air Force One, and 747s will continue to grace the skies for decades to come.

Boeing 747: 50 Years, 50 Amazing Facts

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It’s hard to discuss the 747 without buying into the marketing hype that helped create the giant plane’s distinctive brand. It’s little known or largely forgotten that the 747’s entry on the scene was far from an overnight success. There were great doubts about the plane. Its debut was a failure, in fact. The plane, developed as Boeing’s entry into a competition to produce a giant transport, lost out to the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy. Boeing pivoted and developed a civil version, keeping the double-decker profile and opening the nose bay—two features that made the jumbo jet as distinctive as it was gargantuan.

Even after its introduction, Boeing wasn’t sure it would be able to sell many of the large, expensive planes, but it worked with customers and gave them what they were looking for. Those customers, including Braniff and Pan Am (the latter being the launch customer), worked their Madison Avenue magic on the plane’s image, making it over as both hip and space age, and touting its immense size and groovy upper deck, which some airlines outfitted as a lounge complete with piano and cocktails.

It worked, and the 747 became a hot seller for Boeing. Part of this success was well deserved; apart from the hype, the 747 was and is a remarkable plane—fast, long-legged and profitable for its operators—so after its pop-art launch, the plane began to sell itself. Over the 747’s production span, between 1970 and today, Boeing delivered 1,574 747s, a number that’s all the more remarkable when one considers the magnitude of the production effort and the plane’s high cost. The last 747s off the line retailed for more than $400 million.

The last delivery will be attended by thousands of employees, including many retired workers who helped launch the design in the 1960s. The writing has been on the wall for the 747 for decades with the introduction of highly fuel efficient, fast and large capacity intercontinental twin-engine aircraft, a configuration that was technologically impossible when the 747 was introduced. Boeing’s own 777 helped end the reign of the 747, though it took far longer than many anticipated.

Technically, the 747 going to Atlas Air today might not be the last one delivered to a customer. Boeing is currently working on a new Air Force One version of the famed jumbo jet, the first of its kind and, as it turned out, the last of its kind, too.

We take a look back at the 747’s first flight and its brush with failure.

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A preliminary report from investigators on the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, as you doubtless have heard, looks to be another case of a new flight control augmentation system responding to bad data from an angle of attack sensor and putting the aircraft out of control. That system, as you surely know by now, is called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, MCAS for short. The system is new on the 737 Max. It was developed to give the new mode handling characteristics that would allow it to meet FAA standards after the addition of new, larger and differently positioned fuel-efficient engines that were the raison d’étre behind the Max.

The report holds a couple of hugely upsetting details, the first being that the MCAS apparently once again created a flight condition the crew was unprepared to deal with. MCAS activates when the AOA sensor detects a too-high reading and, thinking the airplane is on the verge of stalling, uses the electric trim system to aggressively trim the nose down, repeatedly. In the case of the Lion Air crash of a 737 Max 8 in late October, in which the same dynamic is suspect as the cause, the crew seemed baffled by what  was happening as the plane trimmed itself repeatedly more and more nose down until the point the pilots couldn’t outmuscle the controls and the airplane crashed into the sea killing all aboard.

Some observers were quick to blame the crew, but it soon became clear that 737 Max pilots had no idea what MCAS was or how to deal with a malfunction in the sensors driving it. How could they? Apparently in an attempt to simplify crew training and sweeten the cost savings airlines buying the new Max would enjoy Boeing didn’t point out the new system or how to disable it.

By the time the Ethiopian crash occurred, pilots of the new planes knew what MCAS was, at least that’s the assumption, though the details on how well the pilots of Flight 302 were trained on the new system is unclear or, in some cases, contradictory.

This detail now seems crucial, as the preliminary report indicates that the pilots flying the EA 302 737 Max initially disabled the MCAS system before, and this is the tragic part, re-enabling it, after which they were predictably unable to regain control of the plane, resulting in MCAS continuing its mischief with the unthinkable results that are hard not to think about.

Now, here’s the speculation: Why did the pilots re-enable MCAS after at first correctly turning it off by killing the electric trim? Some analysts have called the move “inexplicable,” but it’s not. In training we learn that pilots are really bad at doing anything the first time they do it. Things such as flying a twin with one engine shut down or landing in a stiff crosswind are things pilots nearly always fail at doing before they have a chance to practice it again and again. In jets, you do that in a simulator. In Lou Churchville’s terrific series on getting a helicopter rating in a Robinson R-22 Beta II, the author, a long time, highly experienced commercial fixed-wing pilot is terrible at flying helicopters at first because, well, because it’s hard to learn to fly them at all, never mind really well. Read Lou’s stories to get some insights into how that process went and you’ll get some insights into why pilots fail at doing something new and counterintuitive.

In the case of the 737 Max EA 302 crash, the pilots apparently knew what to do, turn off the electric trim. What they didn’t do next is what very possibly doomed the flight. They didn’t use the manual trim wheels to correct MCAS’s previous nose-down trimming of the elevator. Had they ever used the manual trim? It’s second nature to many of us little airplane drivers, but in the case of transport category aircraft pilots, such is not always the case. Did one of the pilots reactivate MCAS in order to use the electric trim to get the airplane back under control? If so, it was a move that spelled the end for all aboard.

You can blame the pilots all you want, but the bottom line is that the manufacturer and the airline are responsible to enacting training systems that assure that pilots won’t ever have to do something crucial that they’ve never done before. In the case of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, it’s a near certainty that that is precisely what was expected of those pilots, with predictably horrifying results.

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